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FM AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2056

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 LUBUMBASHI 0289

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (4 SECTIONS VICE 3 & ADDEE ADDED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOS, PFOR, PINS, CG, MO

SUBJ: THE INVASION OF SHABA AFTER TWO MONTHS

1. SUMMARY. INTRODUCTION OF MOROCCAN FORCES AND ZAIRIAN LEADERAHIP
CHANGES ALLOWED FAZ TO TAKE OFFENSIVE DURING SECOND MONTH OF WAR,
ALTHOUGH THE ONLY FRONT WHERE PROGRESS (OR FIGHTING) RECORDED WAS
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ALONG KOLWEZI-DILOLO AXIS WHERE MOROCCANS FOLLOWING ZAIRIAN
ADVANCES. FAZ HARASSMENT AGAINST ZAIRIAN CIVILIAN POPULATION IN
UNCONTESTED AREAS GREATLY DIMINISHED DURING SECOND MONTH, ALTHOUGH
ROADBLOCKS THROUGHOUT SHABA REMAINED AS MAJOR SOURCE OF HARASSMENT.
LEADERSHIP AND OBJECTIVES OF INVADING FORCE AS UNCLEAR DURING
SECOND MONTH AS DURING FIRST, BUT INVADERS PRESUMABLY SURPRISED
BY INTERJECTION OF MOROCCANS AND NEED NOW TO REASSESS FUTURE

ACTIONS. GOVERNMENT SPEECH-MAKING TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT AMONG SHABA'S POPULATION ALMOST CEASED COMPLETELY DURING LATTER PART OF SECOND MONTH WITHOUT EXPLANATION. EXTENDED VISIT BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAS ALSO TIED UP LOCAL OFFICIALS ALMOST COMPLETELY. WHILE POPULATION OF SHABA BASICALLY OPPOSED TO MOBUTU GOVERNMENT, THIS HAS NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR INVADERS. AMONG REASONS FOR RELUCTANCE OF SHABANS TO ACT HAVE BEEN UNCERTAINTY OF PROGRAMS OF INVADERS AND TOTAL ABSENCE OF MEANS TO EXPRESS DISSENT

INVASION IS NOW WIDELY SEEN TO BE NEARING END. GREATEST LOCAL REGRET IS THAT MOBUTU GOVERNMENT LIKELY NOT ONLY TO SURVIVE CRISIS BUT TO BE MORE FIRMLY ENTRENCHED IN POWER AS RESULT OF INCREASING WORLD-WIDE SUPPORT.

2. MILITARY SITUATION AT THE FRONT.

A. SECOND MONTH MARKED BY DRAMATIC CHANGE IN ZAIRIAN MILITARY FORTUNES. ARRIVAL OF MOROCCAN TROOPS BEGINNING ON APRIL 9, CHANGE OF ZAIRIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AT BOTH KOLWEZI ON MARCH 29 AND KAMINA ON APRIL 19, AND IMPROVED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ALLOWED ZAIRIAN/MOROCCAN FORCES TO MOUNT OFFENSIVE DURING LAST TEN DAYS IN APRIL FOR FIRST TIME SINCE INVASION BEGAN. MUTSHATSHA REENTERED WITHOUT OPPOSITION ON APRIL 25. FIRST SERIOUS FIGHTING TOOK PLACE ALONG ROAD TO KASAJI OVER WEEKEND OF MAY 1. NO QUESTION THAT KEY FACTOR HAS BEEN PRESENCE OF MOROCCANS WHO WHILE GENERALLY REMAINING IN SUPPORTING AND BLOCKING POSITIONS, HAVE SET EXAMPLE FOR ZAIRIANS OF DISCIPLINED FIGHTING FORCE. NONETHELESS, ZAIRIAN FORCES HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN IN FRONT LINES AND BORNE BRUNT OF FIGHTING.

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B. KASAJI, ALONG KOLWEZI-DILOLO RAIL AXIS, REPRESENTS ONLY ONE OF THREE FRONTS. ZAIRIAN UNITS IN AREA NEAR KAKAKUMBA AND ON APPROACHES TO KAPANGA, NONE OF WHICH UNITS ARE ACCOMPANIED BY MOROCCANS, HAVE ALTERNATELY ADVANCED AND RETREATED WITHOUT MEETING STRONG OPPOSITION, BUT ESSENTIALLY HAVE MADE NO FORWARD MOVEMENT DURING SECOND MONTH OF WAR.

C. AS SOON AS MOROCCAN/FAZ OFFENSIVE SEEMED TO BE MOVING STRONGLY, PRESIDENT MOBUTU AND ENTOURAGE OF ZAIRIAN OFFICIALS AND JOURNALISTS DESCENDED ON SHABA, ARRIVING ON APRIL 23 AT FIRST FOR ONE WEEK STAY. PRESIDENTIAL ENTOURAGE VISITED MUTSHATSHA DAY AFTER IT ENTERED BY SOLDIERS AND CALLED ON OTHER MILITARY UNITS THROUGHOUT AREA IN FOLLOWING DAYS. TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVING, PRESIDENTIAL PARTY STILL MAKING ROUNDS IN SHABA WITHOUT INDICATION WHEN THEY MIGHT RETURN TO KINSHASA. LOCAL OBSERVERS SPECULATE THAT PRESIDENT WILL REMAIN AS LONG AS INVASION IS BIG STORY AND WAR IS GOING WELL FOR GOVERNMENT FORCES. CYNICS ALSO POINT OUT THAT HE DOES NOT WANT OTHER

MILITARY LEADERS TO GET TOO MUCH GLORY FROM VICTORIES.

D. PRESIDENT HAS PLAYED VERY LOW-KEYED ROLE DURING HIS
STAY, SPENDING MOST OF HIS TIME WITH MILITARY UNITS AND AVOIDING
NON-MILITARY FUNCTIONS. ONLY PUBLIC STATEMENT WAS PROMISE ON
APRIL 28 OF NO FUTURE REPRESSION AGAINST LUNDA OF WESTERN SHABA.STATE

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MENT APPARENTLY PROMPTED BY WIDESPREAD REPORTS OF FAZ
ATROCITIES AGAINST LUNDA IN LUFUPA AND KAYEMBE DURING MID-APRIL.
IN WAKE OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH NO NEW CASES OF FAZ ATROCITIES AGAINST
CIVILIAN POPULATION REPORTED, BUT LITTLE LIKELIHOOD TO TEST NEW
RESOLVE AS ALL RECENTLY ENTERED VILLAGES ABANDONED BY POPULATION.

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FM AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2057
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 LUBUMBASHI 0289

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (4 SECTIONS VICE 3 & ADDEE ADDED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOS, PFOR, PINS, CG, MO

SUBJ: THE INVASION OF SHABA AFTER TWO MONTHS

JYM ZAIRIAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN REAR AREAS.

A. FAZ MILITARY ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST CIVILIAN
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POPULATION IN AREAS FAR FROM THE FRONT ALSO GREATLY DIMINISHED DURING SECOND MONTH OF WAR. IN KAMINA WHERE HARASSMENT OF CIVILIANS HAD BEEN MOST SERIOUS DURING THE FIRST PART OF APRIL, SITUATION HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL BY END OF MONTH. MINOR INCIDENTS STILL REPORTED OCCASIONALLY BUT PATROLLING SOLDIERS SEEM NOW MUCH MORE CIRCUMSPECT. ARRESTS OF SUSPECTED INVADER SYMPATHIZERS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING APRIL, THOUGH NO FIGURES AVAILABLE.

B. MAJOR FORM OF MILITARY HARASSMENT IN REAR AREAS IS VARIETY OF ROAD BARRICADES. IN AREAS FURTHEST FROM FRONT THESE CONSIST OF PERIODIC ROAD BLOCKS BETWEEN MAJOR TOWNS WHERE AL UNOFFICIAL TRAFFIC IS HALTED AND SHAKEN DOWN. IN KOLWEZI BARRICADES WITHIN THE TOWN REMAIN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS. GECAMINES WORKERS WERE READY TO GO ON STRIKE AFTER MAY 4 KILLING BY SOLDIERS OF ITALIAN ENGINEER WHO FAILED TO STOP PROMPTLY AT BARRICADE. WHILE QUICK ACTION BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU IN ORDERING EXECUTION OF TWO GUILTY SOLDIERS ALLEVIATED TENSE SITUATION, EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY STILL ANGRY OVER OMDZLPRESENT AND EVER-MOVING MILITARY ROADBLOCKS.

4. THE INVADING FORCES.

A. MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVED KOLWEZI COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY INVADERS TOWARD END OF MARCH WITH ONLY SLIGHTEST EFFORT. DEMORALIZATION OF FAZ REPORTED SO BAD THAT ONLY A FEW SHOTS WOULD HAVE SENT SOLDIERS SCURRIYING. OCCUPATION OF KOLWEZI WOULD HAVE CAUSED NIGHTMARISH ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS FOR INVADERS WHO PROBABLY LACKED MANPOWER TO GOVERN AND DEFEND OR SUPPLY LINE TO SUPPORT. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH ZAIRIAN/MOROCCAN ADVANCE, INVADERS MADE ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FROM MUTSHATSHA, TAKING MOST OF CAPTURED BOOTY WITH THEM AND SET UP DEFENSE LINE CLOSER TO KASAJI, WHERE ZAIRIAN/MOROCCAN FORCES WOULD HAVE LESS LOGISTICAL SWLPOR ADVANTAGE. SINCE INVADERS NEVER THOUGHT TO HAVE LARGE FORCE IN WESTERN SHABA, QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THEY WILL HAVE MANPOWER TO FIGHT A SECOND BATTLE IF HEAVY CASUALTIES SUFFERED
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IN PRESENT FIGHTING.

B. INVADERS CONTINUE TO BE SOMEWHAT OF MYSTERY FORCE WHOSE EXACT SIZE, COMPOSITION, LEADERSHIP, AND OBJECTIVES REMAIN UNCLEAR. IN GENERAL, LOCAL OBSERVERS THINK INVADERS LIKELY TO NUMBER ONLY A FEW THOUSAND AND TO BE COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF EX-KATANGANS, BUT WITH IMPORTANT ELEMENTS FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. NO LOCAL LUNDAS SPEAK OF INVADERS AS BEING PRIMARILY FROM THEIR TRIBE. NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY ANGOLANS OR CUBANS ENTERED ZAIRE'S TERRITORY, ALTHOUGH SUPPORT IN ANGOLA CONSIDERED LIKELY AND EASTERN EUROPEAN WEAPONS KNOWN TO BE AMONG ARMS.

C. LEADERSHIP AND OBJECTIVES EVEN MORE OBSCURE. GENERAL MBUMBA IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS MILITARY LEADER, BUT NO PROMINENT MILITARY OR CIVILIAN DEPUTIES KNOWN. ANTI-MOBUTU LEADERS IN EUROPE THOUGHT TO BE STRUGGLING FOR LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN POST-MOBUTU GOVERNMENT BUT NONE SEEMS TO HAVE CLEAR TIES TO MBUMBA FORCES. MOST EVIDENCE SUGGESTS AIM OF INVASION IS OVERTHROW OF MOBUTU, BUT OCCASIONAL DIE-HARD KATANGANS POINT TO FACT THAT SHABA IS ONLY CONTESTED AREA AS EVIDENCE THAT GOAL IS REESTABLISHMENT OF KATANGAN STATE. INVADERS REFERRED TO AS EX-KATANGAN GENDARMES AS FREQUENTLY AS CONGOLESE LIBERATION FRONT. LIKEWISE KATANGANS THOUGHT TRADITIONALLY TO HAVE NON-SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY THOUGH MUCH OF PROPAGANDA IN OCCUPIED AREAS HAS BEEN STRONGLY MARXIST. BEST EXPLANATION OF SEEMING CONTRADICTIONS IS THAT INVADERS ARE DIVIDED AMONG THEMSELVES ON GOALS AND IDEOLOGY. MANY LOCAL OBSERVERS REMEMBER MBUMBA FROM HIS DAYS AS DRIVER AT LIKASI FLOUR MILL AND LATER AS KOLWEZI POLICE OFFICER AND CONCLUDE HE IS LITTLE MORE THAN OPPORTUNIST WITHOUT STRONG SOCIAL COMMITMENT.

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FM AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 LUBUMBASHI 0289

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (4 SECTIONS VICE 3 & ADDEE ADDED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOS, PFOR, PINS, CG, MO

SUBJ: THE INVASION OF SHABA AFTER TWO MONTHS

D. INVADERS ATTEMPTED TO KEEP ECONOMY GOING IN OCCUPIED
AREAS IN AS NORMAL MANNER AS POSSIBLE. MANGANESE MINES AT KISENGE
KEPT OPERATING UNTIL FAZ CUT OFF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY. SCHOOLS
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AND HOSPITALS CONTINUED TO OPERATE DURING FIRST WEEKS. SUB-
SIDIZED CORN FLOUR ALSO RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SOLD
TO LOCUP POPULATION IN SOME AREAS AT ONLY ONE-TENTH NORMAL ZAIRIAN
PRICE. BY END OF APRIL ECONOMIC LIFE IN OCCUPIED AREAS THOUGHT
TO HAVE CEASED AS PEOPLE FLED INTO BUSH WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT
THERE WOULD BE FIGHTING IN AREA. IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER
INVADERS PROMOTED EVACUATION OF TOWNS OR WHETHER POPULATION LED
AFTER HEARING RUMORS OF FAZ TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS IN OTHER AREAS.

E. INVADER FORCES SEEM IN GENERAL DISARRAY AT PRESENT. IN ALL
LIKELIHOOD, THEY WERE GREATLY SURPRISED BY INTRODUCTION OF
MOROCCANS INTO WAR AND NOW MUST REASSESS THEIR OWN NEXT MOV
FS.

5. THE POLITICAL ACTIONS.

A. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM OF POLITICAL ACTION IN SUPPORT
OF EFFORTS AGAINST THE INVADERS ALSO CHANGED DRAMATICALLY DURING
THE SECOND MONTH. DURING THE FIRST WEEKS OF MARCH LOCAL OFFICIALS
APPEARED BEFORE VARIOUS GROUPS ALMOST DAILY CALLING FOR SUPPORT
AND DENOUNCING FIFTH COLUMNISTS. IN THE LATTER WEEKS OF MARCH

THE SPEECH-MAKING SHIFTED TO A GROUP OF TRIBAL CHIEFS WHO OFTEN VISITED SEVERAL VILLAGES EACH DAY TO EXPLAIN (UNENTHUSIASTICALLY) THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE GOVERNMENT. DURING LAST HALF OF APRIL AND EARLY MAY SUCH POLITICAL ACTIVITIES CEASED ALMOST COMPLETELY. WHILE SPEECHES WERE OFTEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, IMPROVED MILITARY SITUATION MAY HAVE MADE THEM LESS NECESSARY IN EYES OF LOCAL OFFICIALS. IN ADDITION, OFFICIALS MAY BE VERY RELUCTANT TO MAKE SPEECHES WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE COMPETING WITH PRESIDENT FOR ATTENTION. POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO POORLY ATTENDED MARCH IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT IN LUBUMBASHI ON APRIL 20 AND A SECOND MARCH IN KOLWEZI ON MAY 10. THE MWANT YAV, THE GRAND CHIEF OF THE LUNDA(EX-DANIEL TSHOMBE), AFTER NEARLY THREE WEEKS OF STEADY SPEECH-MAKING WAS TAKEN TO KOLWEZI IN EARLY APRIL WHERE HE OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATES IN CEREMONIAL FUNCTIONS, BUT IS NOT ALLOWED TO DO OR SAY ANYTHING. THE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL

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STEADY REMINDER THAT THE WAR CONTINUES ARE THE NEWS REPORTS, WHICH IN THE LOCAL PRESS REPEAT EACH DAY HOW MOBUTU'S LEADERSHIP IS PROVIDING THE WINNING INSPIRATION FOR THE SOLDIERS AND THAT THE RUSSIAN-CUBAN-ANGOLAN IMPERIALISM SHALL SURELY BE SHATTERED IN SHABA.

B. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL ENTOURAGE IN SHABA IS BEGINNING TO TAKE ITS TOLL ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. TOP REGIONAL OFFICIALS ARE FORCED TO SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY. WHENEVER SOMETHING GOES WRONG OR IS BELIEVED TO HAVE GONE WRONG, REGIONAL OFFICIALS ARE REPORTEDLY BLAMED. EACH DAY THERE IS A NEW REASON ACCORDING TO RUMORS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS MAD AT REGIONAL COMMISSIONER ASSUMANI. ONE DAY, IT IS BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF SHABA ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY LOYAL; ANOTHER DAY BECAUSE A REPORT DID NOT REACH HIM PROMPTLY. THOSE OFFICIALS LEFT BEHIND IN LUBUMBASHI ARE INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO MAKE DECISIONS ON ANY SUBJECTS, SOMETIMES REFUSING EVEN TO MEET TO DISCUSS AN ISSUE. GENERAL FEELING IS THAT EVERYONE WILL BE GREATLY RELIEVED WHEN THE PRESIDENT DEPARTS.

6. THE POPULAR REACTION.

A. WHEN THE INVASION BEGAN, MOST SHABANS FOUND THE REGULAR SETBACKS INFLICTED BY THE INVADERS ON FAZ AMUSING BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN LONG-SUFFERING YEARS OF MINOR FAZ HARASSMENT. PEOPLE WAITED AND HOPED THAT SOMEHOW THE CONFUSION WOULD LEAD TO THE REPLACEMENT OF MOBUTU BY A MORE ENLIGHTENED GOVERNMENT. AS THE SECOND MONTH PASSED, THERE IS A GROWING REALIZATION THAT THINGS ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE DRAMATICALLY. RATHER THAN A NEW, ENLIGHTENED LEADER, PEOPLE INCREASINGLY SEE AS ALTERNATIVES MOBUTU, WHO IS A KNOWN SVIL, OR GENERAL

MBUMBA, WHO IS A TOTALLY UNPREDICTABLE AND UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 LUBUMBASHI 0289

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOUR SECTIONS VICE THREE AND ADDEE ADDED)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOS, PFOR, PINS, CG, MO
SUBJ: THE INVASION OF SHABA AFTER TWO MONTHS

B. ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS AND POLITICAL LEADERS ARE
DISLIKED IN SHABA AS MUCH AS EVER, ESPECIALLY RECENTLY BECAUSE OF
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THE ROADBLOCKS AND THEIR ACTIONS AGAINST THE LUNDA PEOPLE, BUT PEOPLE ARE TALKING MUCH LESS ABOUT POLITICS NOW THAT THE WAR IS GOING BETTER FOR THE GOVERNMENT. AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE BECOMING AWARE OF POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST THREAT AS RESULT OF DAILY PROPAGANDA AND STEADILY ARRIVING SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR ZAIRE'S ANTI-COMMUNIST EFFORT. MAJORITY PROBABLY STILL FEEL THAT SUCH SUPPORT IS MISGUIDED. AT SAME TIME PEOPLE APPRECIATE FACT THAT FOR UNEXPLAINED REASON GOVERNMENT NO LONGER SUBJECTS THEM TO DAILY HARANGUES ABOUT SUSPECTED FIFTH COLUMNISTS.

C. GENERAL MBUMBA'S ARMY, WHILE CHEERED BY MANY FOR ITS ABILITY TO GIVE MOBUTU'S ARMY A BLACK EYE, NEVER ACQUIRED STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT. PEOPLE REMAINED SUSPICIOUS OF MBUMBA BECAUSE OF HIS PAST AND BECAUSE THEY NEVER BECAME AWARE OF GROUP'S SOCIAL/ECONOMIC PLAN FOR THE COUNTRY. WHILE POPULATION BASICALLY ANTI-MOBUTU AND LOOKING FOR A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT, THEIR SENTIMENTS NEVER TRANSLATED INTO OPEN SUPPORT FOR GENERAL MBUMBA.

D. EVEN IF POPULATION HAD DESIRED TO SHOW STRONGER SUPPORT FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT FACTION, THE CURRENT INVASION HAS SHOWN THE DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSLATING SUCH SUPPORT INTO POSITIVE ACTION IN ZAIRE. FIRST, WEAPONS ARE GENERALLY TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT. SECOND, THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY, WHILE COWARDLY ON OCCASIONS, IS FEARED AS A BRUTAL FORCE WHICH IF NOT TIGHTLY DISCIPLINED CAN EASILY RUN AMUCK. THIRD, THERE ARE NO LEGAL

MEANS TO EXPRESS DISSENT IN ZAIRE, SINCE ONLY ONE POLITICAL PARTY IS ALLOWED AND THE PRESS IS UNDER STRICT GOVERNMENT CONTROL. AND FOURTH, IF A PERSON WERE ARRESTED AS A DISSIDENT, THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS NOR ANY MEANS TO GUARANTEE EVEN THAT THE NEXT OF KIN WILL BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF AN "ACCIDENT". WITH SUCH CONDITIONS WIDELY KNOWN, IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT SHABA'S LARGE COMMUNITY OF DISCONTENTS HAVE SAT BACK AND HOPED THAT SOMETHING MIGHT HAPPEN BUT HAVE DONE NOTHING THROUGHOUT THE TWO MONTHS OF THE INVASION.

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7. CONCLUSION. ALTHOUGH THERE IS OCCASIONAL TALK OF REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE INVADERS, THE WAR IS WIDELY THOUGHT TO BE DRAWING TO A CLOSE. THE LAST GASPS MAY TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS OR SEVERAL YEARS. THE INVASION IS ALREADY SEEN TO HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF ILL EFFECTS. DESPITE WHAT PRESIDENT MOBUTU SAID ABOUT NO REPRESSION AGAINST THE LUNDA, PEOPLE WIDELY BELIEVE THAT THE LUNDA HAVE SUFFERED AND WILL SUFFER IN THE COMING MONTHS AT THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS. SECOND, THE INVASION HAS REVIVED MANY OF THE OLD HOSTILITIES BETWEEN VARIOUS TRIBES, NOT ONLY ON A GROUP BASIS, BUT ALSO ON A PERSONAL BASIS. MOST

IMPORTANTLY, THE INVASION HAS GENERATED WORLD-WIDE SUPPORT FOR
MOBUTU AS A BELEAGUERED VICTIM OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST
CONSPIRACY WHICH MANY SHABANS EXPECT WILL ENTRENCH EVEN DEEPER
HIS HATED GOVERNMENT.
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Message Attributes

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Document Source: CORE
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From: LUBUMBASHI
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